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This Body of Art: the singular plural of the femininei 
Helen A. Fielding 
 
I will explore the possibility that the feminine, like art, can be thought in terms 
of Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of the singular plural.  In Les Muses, Nancy claims that 
art provides for the rethinking of a technë not ruled by instrumentality.ii Specifically, 
in rethinking aesthetics in terms of the debates laid out by Kant, Hegel and 
Heideggeriii, he resituates the ontological in terms of the specificity of the techniques 
of each particular artwork; each artwork establishes relations particular to its world or 
worlds. What is at stake in the singular plural is the multiplicity of relations that are 
lost in the unifying gestures that arise out of radical oppositions.  Indeed, it is his 
critique of oppositions that underlies his refusal to articulate sexual difference; as he 
explains it, categories such as sexual difference imply a difference between things or 
substances rather than refer to the rapport between and within them.  Sexuality is a 
differentiating of the self to itself and to others according to multiple gradients and 
their becomings that we merely represent as masculine/feminine, homo/hetero, and 
active/passive.iv  But these representations do not capture the rapport; they restrict it. 
Accordingly, there is, for him, no subject, no substance and no limit as such. Indeed, 
‘the body’ represents the totality he struggles againstv; it is “itself replete with parts, 
organs—each one discrete and each one connected (by arteries, veins, tubes, 
ligaments) to the others to make up a system, and in turn, an organism”.vi  This 
means, for Nancy, that sexuate identity subsists only in the relation, in the meaning 
that is asserted in the in-between, in the relation as the process of differentiation.  
What I would like to show here is that despite Nancy’s refusal to acknowledge 
sexual difference as such, the singular plural resonates with, and could guide our 
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thinking about, the feminine. Indeed, since the singular plural refers to being as 
necessarily a being-with, I want to suggest, drawing upon the insights provided by 
Luce Irigarayvii, that the feminine might be the possibility of the relation itself. 
Through sketching out my embodied encounter with a particular artwork, I explore 
here the significance of Nancy’s claim that the work of art establishes an alternate 
way of relating to technë than that elicited by instrumental means. The encounter with 
the artwork allows for a rethinking of technë that is rooted in the manifest, and in 
embodiment and not in the endless reproducibility of the representational. Yet what 
my encounter with this particular work also reveals is that co-existing with the technë 
of constructing, is that of the cultivating of relations. While the danger of bringing 
cultivation, embodiment, and relationality together under the banner of the feminine 
seems risky, I would argue that this belonging together is not one that relies on an 
ontic essentialism, but is rather, in Heidegger’s sense, the belonging together of that 
which has been excluded from the articulation of the one or the same in this age, and 
whose inclusion has hardly been thought. Moreover, if we begin to explore the 
feminine as a singular plural, it would not entail the claim that the feminine has a 
universal ontological existence as such. Instead, it would require thinking about the 
feminine as existing only in terms of the plural relations at work amongst particular 
and material bodies that are themselves not homogeneous. Rather than limiting 
relations, I want to suggest that an acknowledgement of sexual difference opens up 
the possibility of relationality itself. 
I turn to Canadian artist Barb Hunt’s “Antipersonnel”, a collection of 58 
knitted pink replicas of antipersonnel land mines that was exhibited at the Art Gallery 
of Ontario in the fall of 2001, precisely because it allows me to reflect upon the 
artwork at work in terms of the feminine as a singular plural. Moreover, this 
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exhibition confounds any opposition between art and technëviii; it combines the 
infinite reproducibility that belongs to technique with the connection to the origin that 
is requisite of artix.  And, as knitted works that at first glance would seem more at 
home in a “church-basement bazaar”x, the mines challenge the split between high art 
and craft that has, in the past, so often delimited the boundary between artworks made 
by men, and the “so-called minor arts” made by womenxi;  a division imposed 
between creation and makingxii.  Finally, the irreducible plurality of the singular is 
remarkably exposed in this singular exhibition of the multiple; for, like the 
antipersonnel land mines they replicate, Hunt’s individual works come in a multitude 
of shapes, camouflaged as water canteens, little boxes, a child’s toyxiii. The singular 
work exists only in the gathering of  its endless and multiple particularities.  Indeed, 
Hunt’s ongoing project, to knit in various shades of pink and a multitude of stitches, 
replicas of the two hundred and eighty-one different kinds of antipersonnel land mines 
in existence, reveals that the work exists through the relations at work between “the 
independent life of every stitch”xiv and of every single knitted minexv. 
A reflection on Hunt’s knitted antipersonnel landmines, moreover, sheds new 
light on Nancy’s rethinking of technë as relation in response to the wars that 
accompany the attempts of states to assert their sovereignty even as, in this age of 
globalization, the existence of boundaried sovereign states no longer seems tenablexvi.  
Nancy brings into question the dichotomies established in the opposition of the 
aesthetic product of art to its technical production, and of art to war; for oppositions 
such as these curtail relations and make possible systems of expansion which never 
directly touch upon anything and yet wreak destruction. For the ancient Greeks, there 
was no separation between the production of crafts and that of artworks, between 
production (poiësis) and its know-how (technë). However, Nancy argues that the 
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modern division between “’[p]oetry and/or technics’”xvii, between the product of art, 
poiësis, and the mode of production, technë, effects a unifying tendency since the 
“multiplicity of the ways in which the work is put to work” is obscured by the 
polarizing effect of the split between product and production, between the technics of 
war and its singular effects (Nancy 1996, p. 6/20). 
The question for him, then, is how can we think about art as a gathering of the 
plural, multiple individual artworks in a gesture that neither denies the “irreducible 
material difference” found in each artwork nor sublates art “in the element of 
thought”(1996, p. 9/24)xviii?  On the one hand, the term art seems indifferent to the 
multiple yet specific and concrete articulations of artworks. On the other hand, 
technics is presumed to be plural and multiplied indefinitely (1996, pp. 5-6/18). The 
differences between the arts such as sculpture, painting, and music cannot be reduced 
or subsumed under a single concept because they open up in multiple ways the 
“irreducible plurality of the unity ‘world’” (1996, p. 18/37). Art as such can only be 
meaningful through the existence of singular works that set to work as artworks.   
As Nancy explains, art reveals that the “appearance of a world is always first 
of all that of phenomena” rather than that of an intellect imposing a world, or 
intelligibility upon matter (1996, p. 18/37).  Color, for example, does not belong to a 
specific object, but rather to a world of relations. Colors transform when they come 
into contact with other colors—they subtly shift their hues and tones.  Indeed, the 
pinks of Hunt’s mines radiate against one another.  If we stay with the mines, we enter 
into the level of pink. Levels, Maurice Merleau-Ponty explains in the Phenomenology 
of Perception, are dimensions or worlds we move into and corporeally take up. The 
body as the first level, is a gathering of capacities open to the world that allows us to 
move into a situation and to take it up.xix With Hunt’s land mines, this adjustment is 
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startling; as one enters the level of pink, the hues of the individual mines begin to 
differentiate one from another. Pink becomes a world of its own, until eventually, the 
shades differ so greatly, they become so distinctive, that one realizes one can no 
longer apply the same word ‘pink’ to each hue. Pink has become a singular plural of 
world, indeed of multiple worlds. The art work thus teaches us embodiedly the 
meaning of the singular plural as a being-with, as a co-existence. The work also 
reveals the level as a world that is fundamentally sensual. From the other side of the 
gallery, looking down lengths of rooms through several open corridors, the pinks of 
the mines continue to glow. But if each pink mine were removed from its gathering of 
the exhibition, of the work itself, it would lose its glow, and its shade would alter.   
 We begin to see then how Nancy articulates being in terms of singular 
relations that cannot be subsumed under any conceptual rubric. There can be no color 
in general; colors appear only in their particular and contextual manifestations. Nor 
can color be reduced to language. As Nancy asserts, the empirical is neither a 
“presumed ‘sensuous given’”, nor is it a “subject presumed sensuous”.  Instead, the 
empirical lies between the one who senses and that which is sensed. This means that 
“the empirical is the technics of the local, the presentation of place”.  Art, which relies 
upon the “detail of its technique … or art as technique of the detail,” can show up 
color in its specificity at the same time as it reveals that color belongs to its local 
manifestation (1996, p.  20/41). We cannot then speak of a world of colors because 
within each world there is a multiplicity of worlds created from each sense-sensed, 
and each local touch (p. 21/42). From each perspective from which one looks at the 
mines, for each particular person who brings his or her sensual body to them, there is 
a multiplicity of affectations. Moreover, each color is not only a “local value”, for 
each one also “combines heterogeneous sensuous  values without homogenizing 
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them: this red  is also a thickness, a fluidity, a figure, a movement, a flash of sound, a 
taste, or an odor” (p. 21/42).  A color cannot be separated from its manifestation; the 
blue of the carpet is this wooly blue. The pink of each singular mine is particular to 
the texture of its weave and fiber as well as to the worlds evoked by its resonances 
with the pink mines around it.  Color can figure as signification at work in, for 
example, the flag, or in Merleau-Ponty’s dubious redeployment of “the eternal 
feminine”xx. However, when color is deployed as such, it moves into the realm of 
representation rather than that of  presentation or patency.  Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, 
red represents the eternal feminine as a cognitive imposition of an essential category.  
In Hunt’s mines, the color pink can ironically signify the feminine and perhaps even 
evoke the color of flesh; yet this evocation is an execution of the technicity of color 
that goes beyond the conceptual.  There is something that is set to work in the pinks 
themselves that exceeds the signxxi. 
It is not just the level of pink to which one becomes attuned; the specificity of 
the individual mines also begins to appear. Even though Hunt seems to have grouped 
like mines together, each one is distinguished by stitch as well as hue. As they begin 
to differentiate under my gaze, I find myself drawn to the softness of the wool; 
indeed, knitted wool is usually worn close to the skin. We don sweaters, scarves, 
mittens knitted by mothers, sisters, friends. Wool warms and nurtures. It safeguards 
against the cold. But my touch, separated as it is from the knitted mines by a plexiglas 
barrier, cannot be fulfilled. Knitting, as one of the feminine “so-called minor arts”, 
has not traditionally been given a space in art galleries.  Hence the mines were placed 
under plexiglas because the artist and curator feared that viewers, not recognizing 
them as artworks, would see them as mere extensions of their touch. As mere 
extension, this touch would prohibit attending to Hunt’s mines as art works and would  
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collapse the gap required for sense to occur. As Nancy claims, the artwork “makes 
visible ... what it touches upon and what it at the same time puts to work through 
tekhnë” is that the “unity and uniqueness of a world are, and are nothing but, the 
singular difference of a touch and of a zone of touch” (1996, p. 19/38).  In other 
words, the art work shows up this cleavage between touch and what  is touched, 
revealing as it does that it is in this gap or space that sense occurs. In doing so an art 
work creates place; it is not merely localized in space, but it in fact creates the locality 
itselfxxii. The artwork at work hence reveals a reflexivity, a distancing of self from 
world that occurs when we do not merely perceive, but rather see ourselves seeing.  
The artwork elicits this reflection upon perception itself (1996, p. 79/132).  
Although Nancy begins with the Heideggerian phenomenological insight that 
things and others become intelligible from within a field of relations, for him, this 
field is a concrete one, exemplified by the artwork. The artwork, in its materiality, 
touches on the “trans-immanence of being-in-the-world”, or connections made 
between things and people. The problem with the phenomenal body, for Nancy, is that 
it is still governed by the intellect. For the phenomenal body moves into a milieu and 
takes it up establishing the “synthetic unity and the continuity of a world of life and 
activity”(1996, p.18/37). From a critical reading of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology 
we know that there is an inherently conservative aspect to perception, especially when 
colonized by the intellect as it is in this age. It leans towards a synesthetic unifying of 
the senses that collapses incompossibles; perceptual stimuli that do not fit into our 
understanding of what we see, or into the field of relations by which things and people 
become intelligible, are often simply not perceived. An artwork, however, by bringing 
to the fore the sensuous world,  can shake up, disturb, destabilize or deconstruct the 
“synesthesia imposed by cognitive reflection”.  Indeed, for Nancy, it is the 
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phenomenal body itself that is disturbed or shaken up by art which “isolates or forces 
there the moment of the world as such….” (Nancy, 1996, p. 18/36-37).  Dependent 
upon breaking open the worlds of senses, art, then, can be no mere projection of the 
intellect. Hence, it is not caught up in the instrumental goals that would subsume it to 
“another thing or use” xxiii.   
Accordingly, the very plurality of the arts, that is, the fact that the arts engage 
our senses as worlds, disturbs the “living unity of perception or action” (1996, p. 
21/42) Art works break open the logic of  perception that, as Merleau-Ponty 
demonstrates, will “’cancel out’ as unreal all stray data” (1962, p. 313/361). If 
perception occurs through the senses trying to make the sensible world intelligible, it 
is then shaped by systems of signification that can override the senses themselves.  
The art work, however, begins with the senses. It “isolates [a sense] so as to force it to 
be only what it is outside of signifying and useful perception. Art forces a sense to 
touch itself, to be this sense that it is” (Nancy 1996, p. 21/42).  Importantly, isolating 
a sense is not the same as breaking it down into an abstract sensation. We also know 
from Merleau-Ponty that sensation only occurs from within a field. We can only 
sensorially perceive the pinks of these land mines from within the world or level of 
pinks laid down by the art work. The “original unity of the senses” evoked by the 
artwork is not the same as the synesthesia produced when the senses are in fact 
denied, when perceptual information is negated or subsumed under the laying down 
of a set of equivalences. Rather, as Nancy elaborates, it is a “singular ‘unity’ of a 
‘between’ the sensuous domains” (1996, p.23/46). The pinks appear in their 
luminosity because they co-respond with one another in the setting up of a sensorial 
world (musical or pictorial) rather than a cognitive system. Although I am not able to 
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literally touch these mines, my visual perception reveals to me the tactile softness of 
them. 
 Hence art, in showing up and intensifying the senses, also “disengages the 
world from signification”.  This disengagement or suspension is touch itself. The 
artwork, in dislocating “‘common sense’ or ordinary synesthesia”, also breaks up the 
unity of the senses that disallows difference. Instead, the art work sets to work a 
response as a co-respondence “from one touch to another” (1996, pp. 22-23/43-45). 
The interruptions of this synesthesia are a communication between the senses, that 
shows up each sense to be more intensely the sense that it is. In short, while 
signification unifies, art as the sense of the world proliferates differences across the 
senses, but also “across each of them”. There are multiple pinks that pulsate according 
to softness, cut, tension, stitch, hue, brilliance, texture, roughness and so on (1996, p. 
22/44).  It is the very materiality of Hunt’s mines which cannot be reduced to this or 
that which provides the force of the work, and not its cognitive “message” or 
signification. Despite the informational aspect of the exhibition which offers facts 
about landmines, the pink mines disengage the senses from signification; the sense of 
the world that is touched upon is absolutely material. 
It is in this rapport between the senses that, for Nancy, sense as meaning is 
produced. Just as sensation cannot occur in isolationxxiv, so too can meaning only 
occur when there is a relation between one and the otherxxv.  Accordingly, the call to 
reflect is not effected by Hunt’s mines in the sense of the sensual sublated into 
thought.  Rather, meaning arises from an “existential communication” between the 
sensuous and the sensed, from a co-respondence between them, from a heterogeneity 
that is produced through this co-respondence of multiple touchings and multiple 
worlds.  This is, for Nancy, following Heideggerxxvi, the rhythm of appearing that 
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does not appear in itself but is rather the gap between, the “movement of coming and 
going of forms or presence in general.…”  This rhythm can provide for the 
communication across the senses as the movement of mimësis and methexis. That is, 
philosophy, poetry, or saying, if we follow Heidegger’s formulations, can be 
privileged only in  that metaphors can circulate between the senses, communicating 
“across the incommunicable itself”(1996, p. 24/46/47).xxvii. Thus understood, poetry 
presents a chiasmus between intelligible sense and sensuous sense. We only sensually 
sense that to which we orient ourselves, and we only intelligibly understand that 
which is supported by perception (p. 28/54). 
If the ‘Idea’ occurs in the gap, in the relation of reflection to the sensual and 
sensed world, then, I would like to suggest, it is the relation itself that is the feminine. 
If the feminine belongs together with the body, with matter and with otherness, with 
that which has been repressed to oblivion in this age, then the suspension of 
signification as touch itself is the suspension of a Euro-masculine imposition of sense. 
Hunt’s antipersonnel landmines are not mimetic in terms of merely copying land 
mines.  They mime with a difference, and it is in this difference or differing that the 
relation appears.  As Nancy  reveals, the pleasure humans take in mimësis is derived 
from the “troubling feeling that comes over them in the face of recognizable 
strangeness” (1996, pp. 69-70/121).  It is the strangeness of recognizing otherness that 
is also a part of who we are, an intrinsic interiority that has been exteriorized. Since 
art is not merely the representational execution of cognitive reflection, it is far more a 
way of bringing the world into being. Hunt’s mines are strange, even monstrous, in 
that they show (montrer) “the strangeness of the world to the world” (1996, p. 
70/122). Derrida suggests that it is this signing and designing, this extending and 
receiving of the hand that for Heidegger, distinguishes humans from animals. In 
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French, the words for to show, monstrer and montrer, make apparent the 
monstrousness of this uncanny, this unheimlich human ability to signify, to reveal, 
and to interpret the world.xxviii  In showing us how we perceive through setting at a 
distance, what is shown up is that humans are the ones who show. What is exposed is 
the monstrousness and the strangeness of what it means to be human, of our essential 
technical ability to transform the world. 
Nancy points out that “images of the weapons of war” function not so much as 
the representation of tools of destruction but far more as the “affirmation of the 
sovereign right of the sovereign power to execute a sovereign destruction”, that is, to 
destroy the other (2000, pp. 121-2).  Yet Hunt’s images ironically point elsewhere, 
against the accomplishment of this destruction; for their effect is far more than mere 
representation. Usually pink wool is knitted into baby clothes, into garments for the 
anticipated births of particular babies and not into images of the weapons of war. 
Moreover, the identities of particular babies only come into being through their 
contact with others, relations that shape their being as a being-with. What is 
juxtaposed in this work, then, is the modern articulation of technë as the finite 
“execution of being” in terms of the accomplishment of a sovereign state through the 
enactment of  war, and the infinite presentation of being as relational that belongs to 
the technë of the artwork and to human relations. Hunt’s mines are hence strange in 
that they reveal the strangeness of the most familiar, the uncanniness (unhomeliness) 
of human know-how in its material manifestationxxix, but it is not a manifestation that 
is shown up through accomplishment but rather through its very incompletion. Her 
mines reveal the most familiar and unthought in order to call us to reflect upon the 
material manifestation of war, upon the ways that war touches us, rather than upon 
what it represents; the work reconnects the product with its production in order to help 
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us reflect upon the specific, singular deaths and maimings that these mines effect, 
deaths that can not be thought merely in terms of the annihilation of ontic beings, but 
rather in terms of the effects of war upon the web of human relations affected by the 
death of even one person.  Without this reflection the effects are consolidated into the 
“figure of the Sovereign Leader or Nation where the community finds its finishing” 
(2000, p. 122), or the suffering is sublated to a cause or  purpose (1997, p. 150).   
Hunt’s exhibition, then, reveals this monstrous uncanniness of our 
technological nature exactly because it is not an aesthetic object, but rather a work 
that sets to workxxx. As an artwork it has no other purpose than to exist, and it is not 
finite in that it will set to work when it is sensually encountered. Moreover, its effects, 
which cannot be controlled, will be multiple since they depend upon the relation 
among the senses encountering the work. And finally, her mines demand that we 
reflect upon “the alien in the sight of the familiar”xxxi.  The technë required for 
knitting is an embodied one with a genealogy, a cultural specificity, and a know-how 
and style that is passed down between generations by  knitters who repeat these 
“banal and tiny motions over days over weeks over months” (Shapcott, 1988). 
Heidegger’s claim that technë as revealing is the “handiwork” of thinking could only 
emerge from a forgetting of a touch that preceded his, as well as of the hands that not 
only welcome and receive in the singular gesture of the handshake, but that also 
caress and cultivatexxxii. As Derrida points out, Heidegger always “thinks the hand in 
the singular…as if man did not have two hands but, this monster, one single hand” 
(1987, p.182).  Yet it takes two hands to knit. Indeed, Irigaray notes that knitting or 
doing needlework as she listened to patients “were topologically intelligent and subtle 
activities that preserved the freedom of both partners in the act”. As she explains, 
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knitting could break up the gestural mirroring that could confuse boundaries in the 
analytic situationxxxiii.  
Hence, knitting preserves difference.  Antipersonnel mines, by contrast, 
destroy it; they are manufactured, produced for the finite purpose of blowing up 
bodies in the name of the Sovereign power of a Nation, for the purpose of the 
finishing, or accomplishing of a community (Nancy, 2000, p. 121). Antipersonnel 
mines are not designed to destroy particular bodies; they are in fact relatively 
indiscriminate about whom they maim or kill--children, women, civilians, soldiers. 
Hunt’s mines, in their juxtaposition of  pink wool and the deadly weapons they 
mimic, remind us of this strangeness, of this uncanniness of technology that can both 
cultivate and destroy. 
 Yet, when Nancy writes that it is “through technology that we are or become 
‘human’” (1997, p. 128), he seems to be drawing upon the early Heidegger’s intuition 
of technë as violent (gewalttätig); for Heidegger in the Introduction to Metaphysics, 
humans are the most uncanny exactly because they are violence-doing in that they 
“use violence against the overwhelming” in an attempt to tame it and to make sense of 
it. Humans are uncanny in that it is their essence to transform the worldxxxiv. Irigaray, 
in her critique of Heidegger’s claim, explains that such an intuition of humans as 
technological and hence inherently violent perhaps arises out of a “masculine 
subjectivity which is unaware of itself” (2001, pp. 68-76). This oblivion entails a 
forgetting of our embodied sexual difference, and hence a forgetting that man is not 
everything, that he is not solely responsible for all that  is created. Heidegger’s 
description of technë as revealing, ultimately as a revealing through language is, for 
Irigaray, a safeguarding through memory that doubles life without creating it.xxxv   
Nancy’s claim that since art as technology has no “pre-established nature”, its 
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endlessness allows us to constantly redefine ourselves (1997, p. 128) is important. But 
in light of Irigaray’s analysis, it could  also be understood as a privileging of technë as 
that which defines being human. Irigaray would argue, however, that this privileging 
arises out of the forgetting of, and refusal to acknowledge, sexual difference. 
Hunt’s antipersonnel land mines, however, seem to reveal Irigaray’s insight 
that, in not acknowledging the “irreducible difference of the other”, man imposes his 
measure on “life that unfolds in itself but whose foundation he does not inhabit” 
(2001, p. 69).  What results is an intolerance for that which is other, that reproduces 
and orders “itself without his governance”.  This violence does not have to be an 
“inherent part of the masculine to be”, but, as Irigaray notes “that violence can come 
from an historical construction”, that is, it emerges with the beginning of History 
where “man imposes himself as the master of nature”  (pp. 70-71).  This violence is 
then directed at that which appears in the horizon as that which evades it, that is in 
excess of it. In the production of antipersonnel land mines otherness is established but 
only in order to complete the one through the annihilation of the other.  While 
antipersonnel mines are anti-knitting mines, Hunt’s works invite a cultivation of our 
perception; rather than institute a sexual binary, they put the viewer who attends to 
them in touch with the feminine and with embodiment; they  bring the attentive 
viewer to a corporeal awareness of the multiple possibilities of human relations, of 
caring and nurturing, and of blowing apart. 
Antipersonnel landmines are effective because they are not perceived, because 
they fade into the background until the moment they are activated. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, Hunt’s mines are also not perceived as such until, as artworks, they set to 
work bringing the viewer to see that she sees.  Indeed, in the Gallery I observed many 
glance at  Hunt’s mines and then walk away clearly not open to a co-respondence 
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with them, or perhaps with the feminine that pink wool evokes; for those who dwell 
with them, however, Hunt’s mines connect the obscuring of the feminine with that of 
the mines themselves, and present a paradox of caring-cultivation and destruction. 
Art is significant for Nancy because, as a technë, it institutes meaning through 
a relay of connections between artisans and workshops, tools and artworks.xxxvi  In 
Heidegger’s reading of the ancient Greeks, the telos of the artifact referred not to the 
end interpreted as aim or purpose, which is its modern translation, but rather to the 
work’s bounding as a thing. This bounding does not mean that the thing comes to an 
end; rather the bounding sets the thing on its way, allowing it to presence.xxxvii  Hence 
for the ancients, there was no split between the product, its production and its effects.  
In modern technics, however, because the product has become an object, or perhaps 
more accurately a representation, the sensual relation has been broken off.  Because 
there is no relation or rapport, there is also neither nearness nor farness (1996, p. 
25/49-50). 
Hunt’s landmines call us to reflect on these different modes of production.  
For what is uncanny about antipersonnel mines is that they are produced by humans, 
but it is a production that seems eerily removed from the effects that it has.  Just as in 
the 2003 war in Iraq, journalists reported on that which they heard about, but rarely 
witnessed, evoking a disconnection between image and word and a detachment from 
the effects of war, so too with antipersonnel mines, there is a distancing effect in their 
very mode of production; the production of mines is distanced in a general sense from 
its effects. Notably, the United States, which goes to war under the sovereign name of 
liberty and freedom, has still not signed the ban against antipersonnel land mines.xxxviii 
Where, we might ask, are antipersonnel mines produced? What is the relationship 
between production and effects? And to what sovereign end are the mines produced? 
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The artwork, when it is not reduced to an aesthetic object, however, although also 
technological, exists only in the ways it connects directly to its effects. 
Sense is produced by the art work through the multiple relations of  self to 
self,  self to world,  and sense to sense. The space created by the multiplicity of 
techniques, of choices, of decisions that the artist must employ in making the artwork 
is the gap held open between artist and product, between poiësis and technë. This gap 
allows for an endless movement, a setting to work that establishes a multiplicity of 
worlds. Hunt’s land mines accomplish this rhythmic communication revealing an 
infinite “space and delay between the producer and the produced, and thus between 
the producer and him- or herself”.  This endless movement of the artwork allows for 
an exteriorizing of the self through a distancing of the self; it provides for a way of  
experiencing and inscribing ourselves in the world in a way that allows for the 
distance necessary for proximity. The mines thus allow for a proximity or an intimacy 
between the viewer and the work because the art work, though finalized, always 
suspends the “presentation of its end” (Nancy 1996, pp. 25-26/ 49-50). In setting to 
work, it is not an aesthetic object, whereby the product is separated from its 
production. Rather, it sets to work and opens up a multiplicity of worlds that can be 
reflected upon. What counts then about the art work is that it exposes that there is no 
absolute origin nor end.  For every singular origin there is a plurality of worlds 
created by a plurality of touches.  That is, the origin is “necessarily plural, diffracted, 
discrete, a touch of color or tone, an agile turn of phrase or folded mass, a radiance, a 
scent, a song, or a suspended movement, exactly because it is the birth of a world (and 
not the construction of a system)” (Nancy, 2000, pp. 14-15).  Hence each world is 
made up of multiple worlds. 
 17 
In short, Nancy claims that modern technics underscores a loss of self induced 
by a series of splittings that cuts off relations. This claim, I would suggest, is not 
incommensurable with Irigaray’s intuition that the oppositional binary structure of the 
one also impedes proximity as it cuts off any possibility of rapport between two. Yet, 
just as meaning does not adhere to the artwork itself but is rather produced in the 
relation, so too, for Nancy, can there be no sexual difference as such.  On his account, 
this would require a given sexual identity that would precede the relation, whereas 
sexual difference is nothing other than the relation, the differing of sex as the spacing 
of intimacy (2001, p. 31).  Rather than providing an account of a boundaried sexed 
subject, he instead describes the subject as a singularity; a singularity is described in 
terms of its inherent being-with structure that also entails a differing within it.  In this 
inherent being-with and self-differing structure, singularities cannot, according to 
Nancy, be equated with ontic being, which he seems to see as intrinsic in any 
understanding of sexual difference as such.  
Yet his account of the sexual as rapport does not seem so far from Irigaray’s 
own claim that sexual difference is relational rather than ontic, and hence that which 
is yet to be achieved (2002, p. 72). Moreover, while according to Nancy, the 
acknowledgement of sexual difference must be tied to a ground whether it be that of 
nature/being (phusis) or reason, Irigaray too calls such grounds into question. Indeed 
both thinkers, despite their indebtedness to Heidegger, dispute the “mystical effusion” 
of being as ground (1996, p. 36/65). For Irigaray this means that Saying as being 
allows only for the appearance of that which is intelligible according to the being of 
the same.xxxix  For Nancy, this means that the artwork does not reveal the world that is 
given in the sense of donation (es gibt). Since the arts are “first of all technical”, art 
cannot be aligned with nature in its opposition to technë; art as technique “means 
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knowing how to go about producing what does not produce itself by itself” (1996, 24-
25/48-49). Artworks are not, for him, revealed in the light of being that remains in 
obscurity but rather are themselves “the light that flashes (lux) and that causes to 
appear” (1996, p. 33/61).  It is the very technical obviousness of the work that sets to 
work and establishes a world. The world is patent but not inherently meaningful; 
rather the artwork reveals that meaning is generated when we reflect upon that which 
is shown up in the gaps between what is sensually sensed and intelligible sense. If  
“art is always the art of not saying it, of exposing that which is not to be said” (Nancy 
1997, 131), then art is that which exceeds the imposition of meaning.  Both Nancy 
and Irigaray seem to agree, then, that what is called for is rapport between that which 
is not said and the intelligible.  Neither seeks a definitive description either of art or of 
the feminine.  
Still, even as Nancy and Irigaray seem to overlap in their approach to the 
relation, there is a difference. For Irigaray the “groundless ground” is woven 
“between those who are same and different” (2002, p. 72).  For Nancy, the groundless 
ground is instituted through the mediation of technë. Indeed, technë is strange 
(bizarre) precisely because it belongs to humans as this instituting or grounding of 
something for which there is no ground (2000).  He seems thus to privilege technë as 
that which allow humans to exteriorize the self in accomplishing the differing from 
self.  Irigaray, alternatively, attributes the mediation directly to the relation between 
two who are different from one another.  Even as Nancy refuses to acknowledge 
sexual difference as such, if we take Irigaray seriously, his account of the self seems 
more appropriate to the masculine as a fabricating and cultivating of himself outside 
of himself (2001, 76) At the conclusion of  L’Intrus, Nancy writes:  
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The intrus is no other than me, my self; none other than man himself. 
No other than the one, the same, always identical to itself and yet that is 
never done with altering itself.  At the same time sharp and spent, 
stripped bare and over-equipped, intruding upon the world and upon 
itself: a disquieting upsurge of the strange, conatus of an infinite 
excrescence. xl 
Intrinsic to his philosophy of sense is a critique of any imposition of sense in 
terms of a prior access identifying and appropriating the other being (1997, p. 59). 
Reading Irigaray alongside Nancy alerts us to the danger that at the same time he runs 
the risk of such appropriation of the feminine in his use of the metaphors of “birth”, 
the “virgin”, and of course the “muses” without recognizing sexual difference itselfxli. 
For Irigaray’s concern is that the advocating of multiple differences without limit 
leads merely to another articulation of the one. 
The ‘Idea’ then does not begin in reflection and then find its projection out 
onto the world. Rather, the Idea is there where “something of the world shows itself”. 
And for Nancy, as Kalliopi Nikolopoulou points out, this Idea, this stranger or figure, 
is feminine (l’Idée, l’étrangère, la figure) (1996, p. 79/132).  She is one of the muses, 
one of the daughters of Memory (Mnemosyne) who provides inspiration or 
“’movements of the spirit’…[who] animates, stirs up, excites, arouses” (1996, p. 
1/11). And this material force, I want to suggest, is the maternal-feminine that is 
repressed, along with the corporeal, in our agexlii.   It is in the figures of the muses, 
Nikolopoulou suggests, that the feminine has a presence in Nancy’s work even as 
sexual difference is never overtly acknowledged. These feminine figures, she further 
argues, are there “in order to produce a regenerative aesthetic discourse”, even as 
Nancy resists the category of gender itself. (2003, p. 176). It would appear, then, that 
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the muses are the feminine that animate the movement, the rapport between, the 
communication that establishes groundless grounds. The muses as a singular plural 
provide for the possibility of multiple grounds, of sense as multiple. 
 There is an ethical dimension to this rethinking of a technics that is not 
controlled by saying, that is by making appear either through the transcendent and 
intentional figure of man, or through the donation of being. Since, for Nancy, it is 
rather existence or the patency of being that touches us, then what is called for is a 
technique that is in touch with the force of its materiality, a “technique as relation to 
endless ends”.  This is what he calls “sense as ethos” which is not an articulated ethics 
as such but does have an ethical dimension which is our grounding in the material 
obviousness, the thereness of the world with which we interact by virtue of existing as 
sensuous beings (1996, p. 38/68-69).  This material obviousness which is obscured to 
oblivion in this age is, I would suggest, the matter of the maternal-feminine, that is, it 
is that which belongs together with the forgetting of the feminine, of cultivation and 
of the relation itself. Irigaray claims that man has forgotten that he cannot create 
everything, that there is that which lies beyond his poetic realm, and thus his 
privileging of technë belongs to this forgetting. The challenge for us then is to reflect 
upon a technics that does not rely on instrumental ends such as sovereignty, as does, 
for example, the technics of war. For Nancy, the potential of  technics lies in the 
acknowledgement of globalization as the end of the Sovereign. In his view we have 
reached this end, but since we do not yet recognize it there is “[w]ar everywhere and 
nowhere” (2000, p. 135)xliii. Hence, Nancy calls us to think again about the 
significance of the singular plural for displacing the technics of war that seems to 
unite both the technological and the emotional, but does so through a radical 
opposition of sense and sensed, of product and production, of life and death.  
 21 
Hunt fleshes out this claim further in her reminder of the singularity of each 
birth and of the caring cultivation required to bring that singularity into being. She 
calls us to think about the singular plural of the feminine and of embodied existence 
through her body of art which is itself a singular plural. If an artwork, for Nancy, is 
more “a style or a manner, a mode of resonance with other sensuous registers”(1996, 
p.36/65), perhaps we too can think of the feminine in such terms. The unity of the 
feminine as a singular plural could perhaps be found in the particular relations that set 
to work in the artwork. As the technë of Hunt’s exhibition reveals, what is at stake is 
not merely the establishing of worlds but rather that of particular and embodied 
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